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The Impact of National and Organizational Cultural Differences on Social Conflict and Knowledge 
Transfer in International Acquisitions: A Causal Model and an Empirical Test 
 
Prior research has generated mixed findings concerning the impact of cultural differences on the 
outcomes of post-acquisition processes in international mergers and acquisitions. To explain these 
contradictory findings, we examine the interplay between national and organizational cultural 
differences and distinguish the mechanisms through which they affect the key post-acquisition 
integration outcomes of social conflict and knowledge transfer. We develop a structural equation 
model to test the hypothesized effects on a sample of 123 international acquisitions carried out by 
Finnish corporations. The analysis shows that whilst organizational cultural differences result in 
increased social conflict, national cultural differences have a negative impact. As hypothesized, both 
national and organizational cultural differences have a positive effect on knowledge transfer. 
Furthermore, social conflict has a significant negative impact on knowledge transfer. 




The Impact of National and Organizational Cultural Differences on Social Conflict and Knowledge 
Transfer in International Acquisitions: A Causal Model and an Empirical Test 
 
Cultural differences have received considerable attention by scholars trying to understand the 
integration processes in international acquisitions. National and organizational cultural differences 
have been used to explain the frequent problems, disappointments, and failures encountered during 
the integration process (Stahl and Mendenhall, 2005). Several studies have provided support for the 
idea that organizational (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger and Weber, 1992; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin, 
Calori, Very and Veiga, 1998; Weber, 1996) or national (Datta and Puia, 1995; Krug and Hegarty, 
1997; Olie, 1994; Schoenberg, 2004; Weber, Shenkar and Raveh., 1996) cultural differences 
contribute to poor performance. However, it has also been argued that cultural differences may 
serve as sources of value creation, and there is some empirical evidence that they may in fact 
improve post-acquisition performance (Larsson and Risberg, 1998; Morosini, Shane and Singh, 
1998). Other studies have criticized simplistic cultural analyses because they tend to rely on 
problematic measures of cultural distance (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006; Shenkar, 2001), or fail 
to include relevant mediating or moderating variables (Björkman, Stahl and Vaara, 2007; Stahl and 
Voigt, 2005; Teerikangas and Very, 2006). Still others have suggested that rather than focusing on 
cultural difference per se, one should examine post-acquisition acculturation (Elsass and Veiga, 1994; 
Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988) or sensemaking (Vaara, 2003) 
processes.  
We argue in this paper that one of the reasons for these contradictory views and mixed 
empirical findings is that most existing analyses have treated the integration process as a ‘black box’ 
without singling out the processes and mechanisms through which various kinds of cultural 
difference affect post-acquisition process dynamics (see also King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004; 
Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano, 2004). Distinguishing such mechanisms is, however, needed if 




we want to better understand the complex and potentially contradictory effects of cultural 
differences on the key post-acquisition integration process outcomes of social conflicts and 
knowledge transfer. Social conflicts have commonly been seen as a source of acquisition failures 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Empson, 2001) and knowledge transfer between the acquiring and 
acquired units a crucial determinant of the ultimate success of an acquisition (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Capron, Dussage and Mitchell, 1998; Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel, 1999). 
To partially fill this gap, we examine mechanisms through which national and organizational 
cultural differences may impact post-acquisition dynamics. First, we suggest that national and 
organizational cultural differences tend to increase social conflict and thus have a negative impact on 
post-acquisition processes. Second, we argue that at the same time, cultural differences constitute 
potential complementary resources that can be exploited through knowledge transfer between the 
acquiring and acquired organizations. We further propose that social conflict has a negative impact 
on knowledge transfer and that the mechanisms through which cultural differences affect acquisition 
process outcomes are influenced by the integration approach taken, as manifested in the degree of 
operational integration. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a brief overview of the previous 
research, we develop our model and specify the causal relationships between the key variables. We 
then proceed to test the model on a sample of 123 international acquisitions carried out by Finnish 
corporations using data on national cultural differences from the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004) and perceptual measures of organizational cultural differences 
and post-acquisition integration outcomes. Most interestingly, the structural equation analysis shows 
that while organizational cultural differences have a positive effect on social conflict, national 
cultural differences have a negative impact. As hypothesized, both national and organizational 
cultural differences have a positive effect on knowledge transfer.  Furthermore, social conflict has a 




significant negative impact on knowledge transfer. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
implications of the findings, the overall contribution of this analysis, and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
THE ROLE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITIONS 
A review of prior research 
While there were some early exceptions (Davis, 1968), researchers did not systematically 
examine mergers and acquisitions from cultural perspectives until the mid-1980s. By this time, the 
problems and disappointments in mergers and acquisitions had shown that new perspectives were 
needed to understand the dynamics of post-acquisition integration. This triggered a wave of studies 
adopting a process perspective on mergers and acquisitions (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hunt, 
1990; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). By this time, cultural analyses had become increasingly popular and 
legitimate in organization and management studies (Hofstede, 1980; Peters and Waterman, 1982; 
Pettigrew, 1979), paving the way for their adoption in the acquisition context as well (Altendorf, 
1986; Shrivastava, 1986; Walter, 1985). Subsequently, there has been a proliferation of acquisition 
studies focusing on ‘cultural clashes‘ between merger parties (Buono, Bowditch and Lewis, 1985; 
Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Larsson, 1993; Marks and Mirvis, 1986; 
Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Weber, 1996; Weber and Schweiger, 1992). In international settings, drawing 
on Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) and  Trompenaars’ (1993) work, researchers have focused on national 
cultural differences (Calori, Lubatkin and Very, 1994; Gertsen, Søderberg and Torp, 1998; Lubatkin 
et al., 1998; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Morosini and Singh, 1994; Olie, 1994; Very, Lubatkin, 
Calori and Veiga, 1997; Weber et al., 1996). However, rather surprisingly, studies of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions have rarely included both national and organizational cultural factors in the 
same analyses (for an exception, see Weber et al., 1996). 




Much of the existing research has focused on the cultural distance between the acquiring and 
the acquired organizations. This perspective builds on realist conceptions of organizational (Schein 
1985) and national cultural differences (Hofstede, 1980; 1991; Ghemawat, 2001). Accordingly, these 
analyses rest on the idea that the cultural differences measured between the combining organizations 
form a critical determinant of the subsequent integration process (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992, 
1993; David and Singh, 1994; Morosini and Singh, 1994). Most of these studies have considered 
cultural differences to be the cause of integration problems. For example, Chatterjee et al. (1992), 
Datta (1991), and Weber (1996) found a negative relationship between organizational cultural 
differences and post-acquisition performance. In international settings, scholars have argued and 
reported some supporting evidence that acquisitions of firms from culturally closer nations lead to 
better outcomes than those from more distant national cultures (Datta and Puia, 1995; Weber et al., 
1996; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Schoenberg 2004). 
While most of these models assume that cultural differences pose significant barriers to 
achieving integration benefits, it has also been suggested that cultural differences can be a source of 
capability development and value creation (Morosini et al., 1998). For example, Krishnan, Miller and 
Judge (1997) showed that the existence of complementary top management teams in the acquiring 
and acquired firm – that is, teams where members represent different functions – tends to be 
associated positively with post-acquisition performance. Larsson and Risberg (1998) found in their 
study that international acquisitions outperformed domestic ones, possibly because they tend to be 
associated with greater cultural awareness. In addition, Morosini et al. (1998) found that specific 
kinds of national cultural differences may in fact improve overall acquisition performance. 
Such analyses have, however, been criticized lately. The use of simplistic ‘national cultural 
distance’ measures has been seen as inadequate (Harzing, 2004; Kirkman et al., 2006; Shenkar, 2001), 
in part because most studies have relied on data collected by Hofstede (1980) several decades ago. 




Moreover, it has been argued that many analyses have not given sufficient attention to other factors 
at play or to the context-specific features (Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2005). While 
these criticisms should be taken seriously, they do not in our view mean that one should abandon 
the study of cultural differences altogether. Rather, the implication is that we need more elaborate 
analyses of the various processes and mechanisms involved. 
It is therefore important to link this research stream with cultural approaches that concentrate 
on the dynamics of the integration processes. Drawing on anthropological research (Berry 1980), 
several studies have examined the acculturation process following a merger or an acquisition (Elsass 
and Veiga, 1994; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Mirvis and Sales, 1990; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 
1988; Sales and Mirvis, 1984). Scholars have, for example, examined how attractive the other 
organization is considered and what kind of integration approach is taken by the acquirer 
(Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988). Veiga, Lubatkin, Calori and Very (2000) analyzed changes in 
cultural compatibility and found that post-merger performance was highest in cases where pre-
merger cultural incompatibility turned into cultural compatibility after the merger – and lowest in 
cases where cultural compatibility turned into incompatibility. Larsson and Lubatkin (2001) pointed 
out that successful acculturation is possible even in conditions of significant cultural differences if 
the acquirer invests in formal and informal control. 
Furthermore, drawing on constructionist perspectives on culture (Martin, 1992), some 
researchers have focused on the ‘constructed’ nature of cultural differences (Gertsen et al., 1998; 
Kleppestø, 2005; Riad, 2005). From this perspective, the point is not to examine ‘objective’ cultural 
differences but rather to focus on subjective interpretations and how they link with sensemaking and 
organizational action. One reading of these studies is that they cast doubt on any ‘essentialist’ 
analysis of cultural differences. However, another interpretation is that these analyses indicate that 
the ways in which cultural differences impact integration process dynamics are complex and closely 




related to identity-building, sensemaking, and social conflict (Gertsen et al., 1998, Kleppestø, 2005). 
Recent analyses have indeed illustrated how post-acquisition cultural sensemaking involves national 
cultural stereotypes (Vaara, 2003) and nationalism (Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari and Säntti, 2005) that 
have a significant impact on the social dynamics in post-acquisition integration. 
While the theoretical perspectives and empirical studies reviewed above have greatly increased 
our knowledge of the post-acquisition integration process, the fact remains that there is considerable 
ambiguity concerning the effects that cultural differences have on post-acquisition outcomes. In 
brief, most scholars assume that national and organizational cultural differences have a negative 
impact on post-acquisition performance. Some argue for a positive relationship, others suggest that 
pre-acquisition cultural differences per se are unlikely to have performance effects and instead focus 
more on process factors, while there are still others who question any ‘essentialist’ analysis of 
cultural differences. In our view, one key reason for this ambiguity is that we lack integrative models 
specifying the distinctive, possibly contradictory effects that both national and organizational 
cultural differences may have on post-acquisition integration performance. As a step in this 
direction, we will in the following outline a model that distinguishes specific mechanisms through 
which organizational and national cultural differences influence social conflict and knowledge 
transfers between the merging organizations. 
 
National and organizational cultural differences as antecedents of social conflict and 
knowledge transfer 
 
Culture has been conceptualized in a variety of ways in the management and organization 
literature. This is the case both with organizational (Hatch, 1993; Martin, Forst and O’Neill, 2006; 
Schein, 1985) and national cultures (Hofstede, 1980; Kirkman et al., 2006; House at al., 2004). In this 
paper, we adopt a ‘configurational’ perspective according to which multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are cultural systems where beliefs, values and practices form specific configurations in 




particular parts of the corporation (Björkman et al., 2007). This conceptualization of culture is 
consistent with Schein’s (1985) widely used model that distinguishes three levels of culture: artifacts 
(visible, tangible, audible results of activity grounded in values and assumptions), values (social 
principles, philosophies, goals and standards considered to have intrinsic worth), and basic 
assumptions (taken-for-granted beliefs concerning reality and human nature). It also coheres with 
Hofstede’s (1980) ideas about underlying worldviews that are manifested in a ‘collective 
programming of the mind’ as well as the multi-level concept of culture adopted by the GLOBE 
research program (House et al., 2004). However, we emphasize that MNCs and units within them 
involve various cultural facets and divisions, the relevance of which depends on the situation at 
hand. In international acquisitions, national and organizational cultures are particularly central – but 
obviously not the only – cultural aspects. Accordingly, merging units can be seen as specific 
organizational configurations embedded in their particular national contexts. 
In international acquisitions, the cultural differences – national and organizational – can 
create problems or lead to value creation. The starting point of our analysis is to assume that 
organizational cultural differences are at least to some extent embedded in the national cultural 
differences. However, while this relationship is crucial, the role of national cultural differences in 
post-acquisition integration should not be reduced to the effects on organizational cultural 
differences. On the contrary, it is important to outline a model that would allow us to distinguish the 
specific effects of national and organizational cultural differences on post-acquisition integration 
while controlling for their interplay. 
In the following, we will focus on social conflict and knowledge transfer. Social conflict is 
conceptualized as inter-group tensions ranging from different opinions to mistrust and open 
conflict, thus covering several dimensions of organizational conflicts (Jehn, 1997). This view has its 
roots in both the literature on social identity building (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 




2000; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and in analyses of organizational cultures (Martin et al., 2006; 
Sackmann, 1992). A central argument in both literatures is that people tend to associate similarity 
concerning beliefs and values with attractiveness and trustworthiness. This is the case whether these 
differences are ‘real’ or more stereotypical conceptions that do not necessarily correspond to 
organizational reality. This association often results in the development of in-group versus out-group 
bias and subsequent cooperation problems and more or less overt conflicts. Consistent with this 
reasoning, research on organizational trust has shown that trust in a person or group tends to be 
greater when the two are culturally similar (McAllister, 1995; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). In an 
international acquisition, where two organizations with different cultures are combined, in-group 
versus out-group biases are likely to be accentuated (Elsass and Veiga, 1994; Gaertner, Bachman, 
Dovidio and Banker, 2001; Terry, 2001; van Knippenberg and van Leeuwen, 2001; Kleppestø, 
2005). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1A. The greater the national cultural differences between the acquiring and the acquired 
firms, the higher the degree of social conflict. 
As post-merger or post-acquisition organizational decision-making processes often deal with 
issues of fundamental importance for the actors involved, organizational divisions tend to 
strengthen and lead to covert or overt political struggles between the people representing the two 
organizational sides (Cartwright and Cooper, 1992; Sales and Mirvis, 1984; Schweiger and Goulet, 
2000; Vaara, 2003). Social conflicts are likely to emerge in settings of significant organizational 
cultural differences. In our view this may be a primary explanation for the frequent findings 
reporting a negative effect of organizational cultural differences on post-acquisition performance 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991).  This leads us to propose the following: 
HYPOTHESIS 1B. The greater the organizational cultural differences between the acquiring and acquired 
firms, the higher the degree of social conflict.  




 Cultural differences can also be linked to value creation. One of the most central value 
creation mechanisms in acquisitions is knowledge transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Bresman, 
Birkinshaw and Nobel, 1999). According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), the raison d’être of 
related-business acquisitions is to improve the competitive position of one or both of the firms by 
the transfer of complementary capabilities between them. Such knowledge transfer may involve 
transfer of knowledge from the acquirer to the acquired company, but it can also involve a transfer 
where the specific knowledge or capabilities of the acquired organization are used in particular parts 
of the acquiring corporation. In this paper, we conceptualize knowledge transfer as the process 
through which various types of knowledge, capabilities or skills originally residing in one 
organization are beneficially utilized in the other. Hence, following the perspective taken in most 
studies in this area (Bresman et al., 1999; Zander, 1991), knowledge transfer here means successful 
knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer can include many things ranging from specific resource 
deployment to more active development of specific capabilities on the basis of knowledge transfer 
(Bresman et al., 1999; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).1  
Cultural differences are potential sources of complementary knowledge and capabilities. These 
differences can thus be seen as part of the complementary combination potential in mergers and 
acquisitions. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) call these benefits ‘economies of fitness’ to distinguish 
them from the more traditional ‘economies of sameness’ (accumulating similar operations). This 
complementary knowledge can be rooted in the cultural and institutional context of the 
organizations (Bresman et al., 1999; Morosini et al., 1998). For example, Morosini, et al. (1998) argue 
that a greater national cultural distance makes it more likely that the target firm will have knowledge 
and capabilities that are different from the acquirer’s own set; ceteris paribus complementarities are 
more likely to exist. This is also in line with contemporary theorizing about the MNC, which focuses 
                                                 
1 Our perspective is thus broad, although one could arguably make a distinction between ‘knowledge transfer’ 
and ‘knowledge creation’ (e.g., Grant 1996, Szulanski 1996, Zander and Kogut, 1995). 




on how the corporation through its differentiated international operations can get access to diverse 
and complementary knowledge that can transferred and recombined more efficiently internally than 
through the market (Kogut and Zander, 1993). Thus, the complementary potential that resides in the 
different national cultures can provide possibilities for knowledge transfers and value creating in 
post-acquisition integration processes. We assume that this complementary potential will have a 
stronger impact on the propensity to transfer knowledge during the integration process than the 
possible increase in barriers to transferring knowledge – or ‘stickiness’ (Szulanski, 1996) – when the 
cultural distance between the parties increase (Cho and Lee, 2004). In other words, the higher 
potential for complementary knowledge associated with a greater national cultural distance between 
the acquirer and acquired units is likely to have a more significant impact on knowledge transfers 
than the possible increase in stickiness. This leads us to hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 2A. The greater the national cultural differences between the acquiring and the acquired 
firms, the higher the level of knowledge transfer. 
However, specific organizational cultural differences can also be the sources of knowledge 
transfer (Bresman et al., 1999; Capron, Dussage and Mitchell, 1998; Ranft and Lord, 2002). 
According to this logic, the greater differences in organizational practices (e.g., in sales & marketing, 
production, R&D, or general management) provide more possibilities for transfer of knowledge 
than situations where organizations with very similar practices are combined. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 2B. The greater the organizational differences in between the acquiring and the acquired 
firms, the higher the level of knowledge transfer. 
  




The mediating role of operational integration 
Various integration frameworks have been offered in the mergers and acquisitions literature 
(Birkinshaw, Bresman and Håkanson, 2000; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hunt, 1990; Marks and 
Mirvis, 1998; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988; Pablo, 1994; Pitkethly, Faulkner and Child, 2003; 
Shrivastava, 1986). These frameworks propose different integration approaches that vary in the 
attempted level of integration. Post-acquisition integration levels for different companies, divisions, 
or subunit can range from total autonomy to total absorption. Related acquisitions usually involve 
some degree of operational integration – what Shrivastava (1986) labels procedural and physical 
integration – as gauged by the extent to which the acquirer standardizes work procedures and 
systems, and removes overlapping operations.  
We expect knowledge transfer to increase with the level of operational integration. First, 
during the process of operational integration, there will be extensive opportunities for people from 
the two organizations to interact and thus detect opportunities for transfers and recombinations of 
the different sets of knowledge residing in the two units (Ranft and Lord 2002). Second, the more 
the two units develop standardized procedures and practices, the easier it will be for the receiving 
unit to see the value and acquire the knowledge residing in the other organization, assimilate it to its 
own unit, and transform and exploit it in its own operations (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000, Zollo 
and Singh 2004). This suggests that: 
HYPOTHESIS 3. The higher the level of operational integration, the higher the level of knowledge transfer. 
However, operational integration may also lead to social conflict. First, the decisions and 
actions concerning standardization and integration of structures and processes are often interpreted 
as a threat to or a disregard of the culture and identity of the focal organization (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989, Cartwright and Cooper, 1992, 1993; Olie, 1994). Second, a loss of autonomy is a 
key concern for the people in acquired organizations (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Nahavandi 




and Malekzadeh 1988). In the worst cases, these concerns are reflected in high levels of employee 
resistance (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999) or management turnover (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). 
While Marks and Mirvis (1986: 41) described these kinds of overall problems as the “merger 
syndrome,” Datta and Grant (1990: 32) specifically talked about the “conquering army syndrome.” 
In summary, and while in certain takeover situations autonomy may not be so important and people 
in the acquired organization may sometimes favour ‘hands-on’ approaches by the acquirer 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988), and a high level of operational 
integration in the long run might help reduce uncertainty, tight post-acquisition operational 
integration is likely to be associated with more social conflict during the integration process. The 
foregoing discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 4. The higher the level of operational integration, the higher the level of social conflict. 
Cultural differences can also affect operational integration efforts. One can assume that in 
situations characterized by greater cultural differences, there is a special need to invest in operational 
integration. This is because more efforts are required to integrate the organizations, especially to 
reap benefits coming from knowledge transfer or other forms of synergy. Further, the larger the 
cultural distance between the units, the more difficult if will be for the top management of the 
acquirer to control and coordinate the operations of the acquired unit (Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). 
Hence, one would anticipate more operational integration efforts in cases of national or 
organizational differences. One might also argue that in situations characterized by large cultural 
distance, managers would sometimes refrain from drastic measures precisely because of the 
anticipated problems related to social conflict. We, however, expect that the need for integration 
constituted by cultural differences would outweigh such tendencies. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
on average greater cultural differences would lead to more operational integration efforts:  




HYPOTHESIS 5a. The greater the national cultural differences, the higher the level of operational 
integration. 
HYPOTHESIS 5b. The greater the organizational cultural differences, the higher the level of operational 
integration. 
The impact of social conflict on knowledge transfer 
While we have argued that social conflict and knowledge transfer are conceptually distinct, 
they are not independent of one another. Knowledge transfer takes place only if individuals are 
prepared to share and exchange knowledge (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). A 
number of studies indicate that social cohesion is an important predictor of resource sharing and 
transfer across units within multinational corporations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1986; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Schultz, 2003; Szulanski, 1996).  
In the context of acquisitions, the importance of social integration for knowledge transfer is 
especially salient. On the one hand, knowledge transfer requires constant open-minded social 
interaction, which rests on a sense of social cohesion and trust (Bresman et al., 1999, Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). As Bresman et al. (1999: 442) noted in their study of knowledge transfer following 
international acquisitions, “individuals will only participate willingly in knowledge exchange once 
they share a sense of identity or belonging with their colleagues.” On the other hand, mistrust, 
conflicting views, and organizational politics can be seen as major obstacles for such efforts 
(Empson, 2001; Vaara, 2003). For example, Empson (2001) has illustrated how fears of exploitation 
(being used and losing one’s own culture and identity) and contamination (being changed in ways 
that threaten one’s culture and identity) impede successful post-acquisition knowledge transfer. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
HYPOTHESIS 6. The greater the level of social conflict, the lower the level of knowledge transfer. 




The hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Sample and procedures 
In this paper, we analyze foreign acquisitions carried out by Finnish corporations. The data 
are based on the national cultural difference scores of the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) and 
our database on Finnish corporate acquisitions. This database consists of data collected through 
three mail surveys, the first covering the period of 1993-1996, the second survey the period of 1997-
2000, and the third survey the period of 2001-2004. The surveys were carried out in 1997, 2001, and 
2005, in each case 1-3 years after the acquisition had taken place. This time lag after the acquisition 
was chosen so as to allow for sufficient but not too long a time to have passed since the acquisition 
to examine the integration process outcomes in a meaningful way (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). 
The average time lag was 1.35 years between the time of the acquisition and the data collection. We 
combined the data to one data set there are no theoretical reasons to believe that the explanatory 
mechanisms would differ across the three surveys. 
The sample companies were selected using data provided by the Finnish Talouselämä 
magazine’s database on acquisitions carried out by Finnish firms. The following four criteria were 
used in the selection of the acquisition cases. First, the acquirer had to be a Finland-based company, 
excluding acquisitions made by Finnish subsidiaries. Secondly, management buy-outs and purely 
financial acquisitions were excluded because these cases usually do not involve a real integration 
process of two companies. Thirdly, the Finnish acquiring party had to have a holding in excess of 
50%. Fourthly, the acquired company’s turnover had to exceed FIM 20 million (EUR 3.4 million) so 
that the study would be able to concentrate on more significant acquisitions. The average size of the 
acquired companies was EUR 99.3 million. 




The data gathering process was similar in all three survey rounds. First, cover letters were sent 
to the CEOs of the acquiring companies to inform them about the research project. Then, the CEO 
or another top executive was contacted and asked to name key decision makers from both the 
acquiring and acquired firms. This procedure helped to identify the right respondents from both the 
acquiring and acquired companies, ranging from 1 to 5 persons. Finally, the questionnaire was sent 
to the identified respondents or the survey was completed by a phone interview. It should be 
emphasized that we focused on ensuring that actual key-decision makers involved in acquisition 
integration responded to the questions rather than trying to maximize the number of responses. 
24% of the responses were from the CEOs, 69% from other members of the top management team 
(including vice presidents and CFOs) and the remaining 7% were members of the board of 
directors.   
To check for face validity, the questionnaire was pre-tested on a group of academics and 
managers and necessary changes were made. We also took several provisions to avoid pseudo-
relationships between variables and to minimize common method effects. For example, to 
overcome priming and consistency effects (Pfeffer and Selznick, 1977), questions were distributed in 
the questionnaire, and other questions, not relevant to this analysis, were inserted between the 
questions used in this study. We found no evidence of common method bias related to our 
measures, since no single factor accounted for the majority of the covariance among the measures 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff, 2003). 
The average response rate in the surveys was 25%, comparing well with the response rates in 
previous studies (e.g., Datta 1991, Morosini et al., 1998) taking into account the confidential nature 
of acquisitions and busy schedules of top managers. The three surveys resulted in a total number of 
123 foreign acquisitions. On average, we received 1.86 answers per acquisition resulting in a database 
of 220 answers. Of the answers, 71% were received from the acquirer side and 29% from the 




acquired firm side and 57 answers were received from acquisitions in Sweden, 35 from Germany, 18 
from Switzerland, 18 from the USA, 14 from Estonia, 14 from Poland, 11 from Great Britain, 10 
from Norway, 9 from Canada, 6 from France, 5 from Denmard, 5 from South Africa, 4 from 
Belgium, 3 from the Netherlands, 3 from Russia, 2 from Hungary, 2 from Italy and 1 answer each 
from Australia, Austria, Brasilia, China, Columbia, South Korea, Lithuania and Romania. 
Unfortunately, Estonia, Belgium, Lithuania and Latvia do not have GLOBE scores. 
    
Measures 
Table 1 reports the variable means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients between 
the variables used in the study. With the exception of the measure for national cultural differences 
and control variables, the  constructs were based on the respondents’ answers on multiple item 
seven-point Likert-type scale questions.  
Insert Table 1 here 
National cultural differences. We measured national cultural distance by using the 
GLOBE practices scores (House et al., 2004). National cultural distance measures utilizing 
Hofstede’s (1980) scores have been widely criticized (Harzing, 2004; Shenkar, 2001). This is why the 
GLOBE project attempted to create elaborate and reliable national cultural differences scores. As 
opposed to Hofstede’s four dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism) and 
later fifth dimension (long-term orientation), the GLOBE scores have nine cultural dimensions: 
assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation, gender 
egalitarianism, humane orientation, performance orientation, power distance, and uncertainty 
avoidance. The GLOBE study reports national scores on both organizational practices and values 
(House et al., 2004). We used the practices scores because they indicate actual rather than ideal 




differences between countries.2 In the absence of existing theorizing that would help us conclude 
which cultural are particularly relevant for social conflicts and knowledge transfer, we used the nine 
dimensions of GLOBE practices score to build an index of national cultural differences using the 
technique developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) that was used by Morosini et al. (1998) (who used 
Hofstede’s data). Our index of national cultural differences represented the aggregate national 









ifijj IICD  
where:   
:jCD   the cultural difference for the j:th country 
:ijI   Globe score for i:th cultural dimension and j:th country 
:F   indicates Finland 
 
By using GLOBE scores from a source external to the sample we avoided the problem of common 
method variance caused by the same individuals answering questions about national culture in the 
same way as they answer questions about social conflict or knowledge transfer. In addition, we could 
thus deal with retrospective rationalizing concerning national cultural differences (Golden, 1992; 
Huber and Power, 1985). A further strength of using the GLOBE measures is that the data collected 
for the GLOBE study overlaps with the time period covered in our research. 
Organizational cultural differences. Following the example of previous studies (Chatterjee 
et al., 1992; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Weber, 1996; Weber et al., 1996), we used direct questions 
concerning the perceived cultural differences that existed before the acquisition as reported by top 
managers. According to Chatterjee et al. (1992), assessing perceptions of cultural differences rather 
than examining the more tangible and objective outcomes of culture such as reward structures or 
                                                 
2 The statistical tests further supported this choice by showing that practices scores measuring actual 
differences correlated more strongly with post-acquisition integration outcomes than value scores measuring 
ideal differences.   




mission statements is advantageous because perceptions are likely to be better predictors of 
behaviour. Elsass and Veiga (1994) also suggest that perceived cultural differences are important 
because the more dissimilar the out-groups are perceived to be, the more strongly the negative 
feelings in-group members are likely to hold.  
We asked managers to describe the extent of cultural differences across key organizational 
functions. These included management and control, sales and marketing, production, research and 
development, and finance. In addition, we asked managers to describe differences in company values 
in general and differences in the values of key decision makers. This approach involved managers 
retrospectively evaluating the organizational cultural differences prior to the acquisition between the 
acquiring and the acquired firms. It can be argued that the differences should be measured at the 
time the acquisition is completed. However, gaining access to the firms at that time is extremely 
difficult. We also maintain that managers are able to reasonably recall the pre-acquisition situations 
because acquisitions have the affect of sharpening rather than dulling memory. Furthermore, 
learning about actual organizational cultural differences as opposed to stereotypical assumptions 
takes time, which suggests that the assessment should take place after real experiences of the 
integration efforts. In the questionnaire, we included a set of questions about cultural differences at 
the time of the survey to control whether managers were able to distinguish between cultural 
differences at the time of the acquisition and at the time of the survey. When we compared answers 
to the questions of cultural differences prior to the acquisition and cultural differences at the time of 
the survey, we found significant differences. Therefore, we have reason to believe that managers 
were able to distinguish between prior organizational cultural differences and current organizational 
cultural differences.  
Operational integration. Adapting the items used in previous studies (Krishnan and Park, 
2003; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Lubatkin et al., 1998; Morosini and Singh, 1994; Weber et al., 




1996), our operational integration construct is based on targeted questions measuring the level of 
operational integration activities. The respondents were asked about the extent to which (i) 
overlappings between the units had been eliminated, (ii) there was a tendency to standardize 
practices, and (iii) integration decisions were aimed at the realization of synergy, e.g., through cost 
reduction.  
Social conflict. In accordance with studies on social identity building (van Knippenberg and 
van Leeuwen, 2001; Pratt, 2001; Terry, 2001) social conflict was measured by four questions on 
inter-group tensions covering different dimensions of organizational conflicts (Jehn, 1997). We 
constructed this composite measure of social conflict from the respondents’ answers to questions 
concerning the extent of different opinions, cooperation problems, conflicts, and mistrust between 
the merger partners.   
Knowledge transfer. In the operationalization of knowledge transfer construct, we followed 
the example of previous studies on organizational knowledge transfer in general (Zander, 1991) and 
in acquisitions in particular (Bresman et al., 1999; Capron et al., 1998). Our knowledge transfer 
construct was measured by five questions concerning the extent to which knowledge transfer had 
resulted in benefits across the following organizational functions: management and control, sales and 
marketing, production, research and development, and finance. 
 
Control variables  
Size. Following previous studies (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Kusewitt, 1985; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Morosini et al., 1998), we controlled for the size of the acquisition. 
We measured this as the turnover by the acquired company at the time of acquisition using external 
data from the database of the financial magazine Talouselämä. 




Time elapsed. Time elapsed since acquisition could impact the outcome of acquisitions and 
the perceptions of the respondents (Greenwood, Hinings and Brown, 1994; Very et al., 1997). 
Bresman et al. (1999) found empirical evidence that knowledge transfer in acquisitions was positively 
related to time elapsed since acquisition. Given that our data were collected from 1 to 3 years after 
acquisition, we controlled for the possible temporal variance by recording the age of the merger as 
the number of years (1, 2, or 3) which transpired from the time of the merger to the time that we 
received the completed questionnaire (Very et al., 1997). We used external data from the database of 
the financial magazine Talouselämä.  
Industry type. Among others, Morosini et al. (1998) suggest that industry type might impact 
post-acquisition integration due to differences reported in the preference of acquisitions as an entry 
mode (Kogut & Singh, 1998). We controlled for sectoral effects by using a dummy variable to 
indicate whether the acquisition was in service industry (1= service industry, 0=others) using 
external data from the database of the financial magazine Talouselämä.  
Respondent. As our sample included responses from both the acquiring and the acquiring 
firms side, we controlled the respondent status by using a dummy variable (1=acquiring firm, 
0=acquired firm).  
 
Structural equation analysis 
We tested our propositions using structural equation modelling (Byrne 2001). Before entering 
the variables into the model, we adjusted the data to assure homoscedasticity by weighting each 
observation by the constant n1 , which guaranteed the equality of variance between single and 
multiple response cases.3 In addition, we standardized all variables.  
                                                 
3 Typically, researchers have used the mean scores of multiple respondents to represent an acquisition or a 
top management team in an acquisition. However, for the purposes of structural equation modelling, the use 




We used the AMOS 7.0 program with covariance matrix as input and maximum likelihood as 
estimation method4 and followed the two-stage procedure recommended by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988). The first stage involved estimating the measurement model using confirmatory factor 
analysis in order to test whether the constructs exhibited sufficient unidimensionality, validity and 
reliability. The second stage identified the structural model and tested the hypothesized relationships 
between the constructs. We used maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
Results of the measurement model 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of the measurement model. Overall, the measurement 
model performed well with comparative fit index (CFI) at 0.922, DELTA 2 index at 0.923, TLI at 
0.893, and RMSEA at 0.083. We examined the estimated loadings and their significance levels. The 
loadings for all measurements beta were significant at p < 0.001 level.  
                                                                                                                                                             
of mean scores for multiple response cases is problematic because mean scores lead to an unequal variance 
between the cases that have a single respondent compared with those that have multiple respondents. 
Therefore, in order to fulfill the assumption of homoscedasity, i.e. the equality of variance, we weighted each 
observation by a constant n1 .  
The constant is derived from a basic variance formula,    xaax varvar 2  . By using this formula, we can 
show that the constant for which the variance of mean is equal to the variance of a single observation (e.g. var 
  var xn ), is n . Multiplying the mean by the constant n  equals multiplying each case by the 


































nxn   
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998; Sanders and Smidt, 2000). 
 
4 In the presence of incomplete data, ML estimation offers several advantages over both the listwise and 
pairwise deletion approaches (Arbuckle, 1996; Byrne, 2001). For example, when the unobserved values are 
missing completely at random, listwise estimates are consistent, but not efficient, whereas ML estimates are 
both consistent and efficient. Also, when the unobserved values are only missing at random, both listwise and 
pairwise estimates can be biased but ML estimates are asymptotically unbiased. In addition, ML estimation 
produces standard error estimates and provides a method for testing hypotheses, unlike pairwise estimation. 
Finally, when missing values are nonignorable, all procedures can yield biased results but compared with 
listwise and pairwise deletion approaches, ML estimates exhibit the least bias (Little and Rubin, 1989). For a 
discussion on ML estimation, see Arbuckle (1996). 
 





                 Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here 
While there is no simple overall yardstick to evaluate the measurement model, there are useful 
indicators (Boomsma, 2000; Hu and Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau and Wen, 2004). Shook, Ketchen, 
Hult and Kachmar (2004) recommend calculating composite reliability, which draws on the 
standardized loadings and measurement error for each item. According to Fornell and Larcker 
(1981), 0.70 is an acceptable minimun level for composite reliability, with each indicator reliability 
above 0.50. In our model, composite reliabilities ranged from 0.87 to 0.95 with indicator reliabilities 
above 0.50, which suggested good reliability for our measures. Another test for convergent validity is 
average variance. Shook et al. (2004) suggest that convergent validity is achieved when the average 
variance extracted is above 50%. The average variances in our model ranged from 69% to 73%, 
which suggested good convergent validity. We tested discriminant validity by conducting pairwise 
tests of all theoretically related constructs (Anderson, 1987). The pairwise tests showed that 
confirmatory factor analysis model representing two measures with two factors fit the data 
significantly better than a one-factor model, which supported the discriminant validity of the model.  
Overall, the results indicated that our constructs were adequate to proceed to the second stage of 
structural equation modeling. 
 
Results of the structural model  
Table 4 presents the standardized parameter coefficients and their Z-statistics for the 
hypothesized path model. 
      Insert Table 4 here  
Hypothesis 1a suggested that national cultural differences are positively associated with 
social conflict. The relationship was significant but – interestingly enough – in the opposite direction 
than hypothesized as indicated by a negative and statistically significant beta estimate (b = -0.27, p < 




0.001). In other words, national cultural differences were associated with less rather than more social 
conflicts between the parties. Hypothesis 1b proposed that organizational cultural differences are 
associated with greater level of social conflict. The results offered clear support for this hypothesis, 
indicated by a significant beta estimate (b= 0.96, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2a, suggesting a positive 
relationship between national cultural differences and knowledge transfer, was supported by the data 
(b = 0.16, p < 0.01). The hypothesized positive relationship between the organizational cultural 
differences and knowledge transfer was also supported by the data (b = 0.53, p < 0.001), rendering 
support to hypothesis 2b.  
In hypothesis 3, we proposed that the greater the operational integration, the higher the level 
of social conflict. The results indicate no empirical support for this hypothesis (b = -0.07, non 
significant). According to hypothesis 4, the greater the level of operational integration the higher the 
level of knowledge transfer between the acquiring and acquired units. The standardized parameter 
estimate was positive and highly significant (b = 0.44, p < 0.001), therefore supporting hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5a proposed that the greater the national cultural differences, the higher the level of 
operational integration.  We found only weak support for this hypothesis (b = 0.13, p < 0.10). In a 
similar vein, hypothesis 5b suggested that the greater the level of organizational cultural differences, 
the higher the level of operational integration. The results offered strong support for hypothesis 5b 
(b = 0.75, p < 0.001). Finally, we found clear support for hypothesis 6, which suggested that the 
greater the level of social conflict, the lower the level of knowledge transfer (b = -0.27, p < 0.001).  
We controlled for the relationship between national cultural differences and organizational 
cultural differences. The model suggested that a strong relationship existed between national cultural 
differences and organizational cultural differences (b = 0.69, p < 0.001). The results concerning 
specific control variables suggested that time elapsed since the acquisition was positively related to 
knowledge transfer (b = 0.07, p < 0.10). We also controlled for the effect of size of the acquired 




firm, service industry and respondent status (whether the respondent represented the acquiring or 
the acquired firm side) on knowledge transfer, but none of the relationships were statistically 
significant. 
Our hypotheses tested linear relationships. However, it has been argued (Björkman et al., 
2007) that the effects of cultural differences might be positive for mid-range values while negative 
for upper-range values. Therefore, we conducted additional regression analyses that included both 
first order and second order terms of national and organizational cultural differences. None of the 
second order terms were significant when either social conflict or knowledge transfer was used as a 
dependent variable. This suggested that no curvilinear effects were present concerning hypotheses 
1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. 
 
DISCUSSION 
While existing research on mergers and acquisitions has pointed to the key role that cultural 
differences play in post-acquisition integration, these studies have produced mixed results as to the 
relationship between national and organizational cultural differences and post-acquisition outcomes 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Krishnan et al., 1997; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Morosini et al., 1998; 
Veiga et al., 2000; Weber, 1996; Weber et al., 1996). To partially explain these contradictory findings, 
we developed and empirically tested a model which specifies which mechanisms through national 
and organizational cultural differences affect post-acquisition dynamics. Figure 2 below summarizes 
the findings. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
We hypothesized that cultural differences tend to increase social conflict. Our results show 
that while organizational cultural differences increase social conflict, national cultural differences 
tend to reduce such conflict. This negative relationship was unexpected, but it may be explained by 




the fact that we included organizational cultural differences in our model. We think that concrete 
organizational cultural differences in specific beliefs, values and practices are often linked with actual 
conflicts of interests (related to standardization, overlapping operations, etc.) and divergent views on 
what should be the integration strategy (concerning overlapping operations, layoffs, etc.). Such 
differences can be seen as root causes of social conflict, and this may help to explain why numerous 
studies have reported a negative relationship between cultural differences and post-acquisition 
performance (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Weber, 1996; Weber et al., 
1996). This effect of organizational cultural differences does not in itself explain why national 
cultural differences would alleviate conflicts as seems to be the case in our data. However, it is likely 
that people pay more attention to and make special efforts to address cultural differences when these 
are apparent as is the case with apparent national cultural differences. In this way, a large national 
cultural distance between the acquirer and the acquired units may actually help in preparing for and 
dealing with potential conflict situations. This view is consistent with studies pointing to a ‘Psychic 
Distance Paradox’ (O’Grady and Lane, 1996) in international business. 
We also hypothesized that cultural differences would have a positive impact on knowledge 
transfer by providing potential combinatory synergies as well as learning opportunities. Here we 
found strong evidence for the positive impact of both national and organizational cultural 
differences on knowledge transfer. These results support the view that concrete potential for 
complementarity residing in organizational beliefs, values and practices seem to drive knowledge 
transfer in post-acquisition settings. Furthermore, the different national contexts – reflected in 
national cultural differences – can provide special learning opportunities per se. This is indeed what 
theories on international or cross-cultural management indicate. In all, we believe that these are two 
key mechanisms behind the results of those studies reporting a positive effect of cultural differences 
on post-acquisition performance (Larsson and Risberg, 1998; Morosini et al., 1998). The fact that the 




added complementarities were of greater importance for knowledge transfer than the potential 
stickiness (Szulanski, 1996) that may be associated with knowledge transfer between culturally 
distant units (Cho and Lee, 2004), is also an important finding. 
We further examined operational integration, hypothesizing that the degree of operational 
integration has a positive effect on knowledge transfer but also increases social conflict. Our results 
show that operational integration has a strong positive impact on knowledge transfer, suggesting 
that at least a moderate level of integration is a prerequisite for realizing synergies in related 
acquisitions, which is consistent with the previous analyses (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In 
contrast, the hypothesis that operational integration tends to increase social conflict was not 
supported. One possible explanation for this is that without clear-cut decisions, many of the 
organizational conflicts can remain unresolved and continue to undermine social cohesion. For 
example, it has been observed that hesitation in approaching integration and lack of decisive action 
can generate suspicion and mistrust after corporate takeovers (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Also, a laissez-faire approach is not able to resolve fundamental 
conflicts of interest and can instead reinforce internal politics (Vaara, 2003). 
This study also analyzed the relationship between national and organizational cultural 
differences and operational integration. Our data provides clear support for the view that 
organizational cultural differences have a strong impact on operational integration. This is probably 
an effect of the need to invest more in integration in situations where there are clear differences in 
organizational beliefs, values, or practices. When interpreting these findings, one should bear in 
mind that our sample consists of related acquisitions. Many such acquisitions are motivated by 
potential synergy gains the realization of which does require integration efforts. The fact that we 
only received marginal support for the impact of national cultural differences on integration is 
actually not surprising. This is because – once again – concrete organizational cultural differences 




may be the most obvious causes for integration efforts, while the impact of national cultural 
differences may be more ambiguous. Further, the greater geographical distance that is often 
associated with large national cultural differences may make integration efforts difficult. 
Finally, we hypothesized that social conflict would have an adverse effect on knowledge 
transfer. This was clearly supported by our data, implying that a positive atmosphere is beneficial 
and often even necessary for effective transfer of knowledge. When we consider this finding in the 
context of the dual effects of operational integration discussed above, we indeed have a clear 
illustration of the complexities related to knowledge transfer during post-acquisition integration. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In our view, this analysis makes four contributions to the literature on cultural differences in 
mergers and acquisitions. First, the primary contribution of this analysis is that it singles out specific 
mechanisms through which cultural differences impact post-acquisition integration outcomes. To 
our knowledge, this is the first empirically grounded model that disentangles and clarifies the way in 
which national and organizational cultural differences affect social conflict and knowledge transfer. 
By so doing, this analysis helps to explain some of the contradictory findings in previous research 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin et al., 1999; Krishnan et al., 1997; Morosini et al., 1998; 
Shimizu et al., 2004; Veiga et al., 2000; Weber, 1996; Weber et al., 1996). 
Second, consistent with our configurational perspective on cultural differences, we have 
examined the interplay between national and organizational differences. While there are undoubtedly 
other important cultural facets, our analysis is still one of a very few that distinguish between these 
two factors and their inter-linked effects (see also Weber et al., 1996). Most interestingly, the effects 
of national and organizational cultural differences seem to be different, at least in the case of their 
impact on social conflict. Our interpretation is that specific organizational cultural differences are 




often the root causes of conflict, while national cultural differences may actually help in conflict 
situations. Although these results might be related to the specific data that we have according to 
which the foreign acquisitions of Finnish corporations are driven by knowledge transfer and other 
kinds of synergy, we nevertheless believe that one would also find similar patterns in other contexts. 
Regardless of the specific findings, pointing to the different effects of national and organizational 
cultural differences is also important per se, as it shows that national and organizational factors 
should not simply be lumped together, as is often done in research and in practice. We hope that our 
analysis will provide impetus for future studies on more fine-grained distinctions such as industrial 
and professional cultural differences. 
Third, to our knowledge, this is the first post-acquisition integration study that builds on the 
GLOBE project data (House et al., 2004). Our analysis shows that the GLOBE measures can help to 
explain phenomena such as social conflict and knowledge transfer. This is important in terms of the 
applicability of the GLOBE project data, but it is especially significant given the wide criticism that 
use of Hofstede’s or Trompernaars’ measures has received in international business literature 
(Kirkman et al., 2006). Obviously, the GLOBE national level data can at best only provide partial 
and proximal explanations, but they do seem to provide one fruitful way to move forward in 
analyses of cultural differences in the M&A context. 
Fourth, by indicating that social conflict has an adverse effect on knowledge transfer, this 
study helps us understand the inherent complexities related to knowledge transfer during post-
acquisition integration. In this sense, our analysis complements the previous analyses on post-
acquisition knowledge transfer (Bresman et al., 1999, Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Moreover, by 
highlighting the adverse effects of social conflict, it also adds to the more general discussions around 
knowledge and capability transfer (Kostova, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Szulanski, 1996, 2000). 




While our study advances our knowledge of the role of cultural differences in post-acquisition 
integration, some limitations of this research need to be noted. First, like any structural equation 
model, ours encompasses only a limited number of causal mechanisms. Second, our data set consists 
of Finnish corporate acquisitions and is thereby related to the specific characteristics of this setting. 
While these results are likely to make sense in other contexts as well, it would be interesting to 
compare the findings with samples from other countries. Third, the data are partly based on the 
perceptions of the key decision-makers. While this is a common and widely accepted approach, it 
also inevitably involves some methodological concerns. Most importantly, the relationships between 
the variables that come from the survey may be affected by retrospective recall or post-hoc 
constructions (Golden, 1992; Miller, Cardinal and Glick, 1997; Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002). 
However, it should be noted that this concern is not related to national cultural differences and that 
in the case of organizational cultural differences the singling out of specific mechanisms should 
alleviate some of the problems. Based on previous studies, one could assume that people would be 
likely to associate organizational cultural differences with problems such as social conflict, but not 
with knowledge transfer or other forms of synergy (e.g., Vaara 2002). Yet, our findings indicate 
strong relationships in both cases. It should also be empasized that our statistical tests showed no 
signs of common method bias problems. Fourth, this study has measured key decision-makers’ 
views. They are arguably the people who should have the best overall picture of the integration 
processes. However, this focus on the top levels of hierarchy also means that their perspectives are 
likely to differ, for example, from those of the operating staff. 
Our study clarifies some of the essential mechanisms linking cultural differences with overall 
post-acquisition success. Nonetheless, a variety of issues need closer scrutiny in future studies. As 
discussed above, there is an apparent need for further analyses disentangling and clarifying the role 
and relationships of the various factors that are often considered under the broad umbrella of 




‘cultural differences.’ This should include an analysis of curvilinear effects. For example, the effects 
on social conflict can be much more complex than our model of linear causality assumes. There is 
also a need to better understand how factors other than operational integration mediate the impact 
of cultural variables on either social conflict or knowledge transfer, and there may be other processes 
and mechanisms than social conflict and knowledge transfer through which cultural difference 
impact the ultimate performance of the combined units. There are also likely to be various socio-
psychological tendencies related to cultural differences, social conflict, and perceived success that 
should be given attention in future studies. For example, performance might be cognitively 
associated with cultural differences as experiences of success may reduce the importance of cultural 
differences while failures could make the people involved over-emphasize them. 
In conclusion, in this paper we have taken a critical view on simplistic analyses of cultural 
differences in post-acquisition integration. However, unlike some others, we do not believe that we 
have come to a dead end with this stream of research. Rather, we believe that there is a need to go 
further by singling out specific processes and mechanisms and to be prepared for surprising and 
contradictory findings stemming from particular contexts. We are dealing with a complex 
phenomenon that is likely to keep scholars occupied for many years to come. 
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 Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the latent variables in the model  
 
 
Variable mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Knowledge transfer in management & control 4.62 1.51 1
2 Knowledge transfer in sales & marketing 4.19 1.54 0.52*** 1
3 Knowledge transfer in production 4.01 1.78 0.42*** 0.42*** 1
4 Knowledge transfer in R&D 4.18 1.64 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.60*** 1
5 Knowledge transfer in finance 4.58 1.74 0.57*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.42*** 1
6 Different opinions 4.37 1.47 -0.19** -0.19** -0.17+ -0.18** -0.18** 1
7 Cooperation problems 3.96 1.57 -0.23** -0.13+ -0.9 -0.17+ -0.10 0.77*** 1
8 Conflicts 3.21 1.64 -0.25*** -0.18** -0.10 -0.17+ -0.09 0.62*** 0.72*** 1
9 Mistrust between the employees 3.29 1.66 -0.22** -0.15+ -0.1 -0.12 -0.11 0.55*** 0.61*** 0.70*** 1
10 Cultural differences in management & control 5.58 1.07 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.18** 0.16+
11 Cultural differences in sales & marketing 5.07 1.26 0.08 0.06 0.21** 0.07 0.01 0.24*** 0.22** 0.16+ 0.23**
12 Cultural differences in production 4.59 1.46 0.09 -0.00 0.18** 0.08 0.03 0.18+ 0.1 0.08 0.21**
13 Cultural differences in R&D 4.61 1.46 -0.03 0.03 0.15+ 0.08 0.03 0.16+ 0.18+ 0.14+ 0.20**
14 Cultural differences in finance 4.69 1.49 0.14+ 0.18** 0.07 0.02 0.27*** 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.04
15 Cultural differences in company values in general 4.80 1.32 0.06 0.14+ 0.15+ 0.05 0.07 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.19** 0.19**
16 Cultural  differences in values of key decision makers 4.93 1.21 0.06 0.22** 0.17+ 0.08 0.15+ 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.23** 0.12+
17 Elimination of overlappings 3.83 1.75 0.13+ 0.17+ 0.16+ 0.22** 0.16+ -0.00 -0.06 0.06 0.07
18 Standardization of practices 4.79 1.27 0.17+ 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.13+ 0.16+ -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.04
19 Decisions based on maximization of synergies 4.71 1.35 0.09 0.17+ 0.23** 0.16+ 0.06 0.01 0.1 -0.02 0.04
20 National cultural differences 0.49 0.15 0.14+ 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.17+ 0.15+ -0.15+ -0.15+ -0.19** -0.11
21 Size of the acquired firm (millions of EUR) 99.34 229.89 0.04 -0.12+  '-0.07 -0.06 -0.10 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09
22 Time elapsed 1.35 1.04 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.13+ 0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11
23 Service industry 0.01 0.12 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.02
24 Respondent status (acquirer vs. acquired) 0.29 0.46 -0.09 -0.21** -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13+ -0.16* -0.03 -0.01
***p  <0.001, **p  < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p  < 0.10, two-tailed tests  
 
 




Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Knowledge transfer in management & control
2 Knowledge transfer in sales & marketing 
3 Knowledge transfer in production
4 Knowledge transfer in R&D




9 Mistrust between the employees
10 Cultural differences in management & control 1
11 Cultural differences in sales & marketing 0.37*** 1
12 Cultural differences in production 0.36*** 0.37*** 1
13 Cultural differences in R&D 0.39*** 0.31*** 0.54*** 1
14 Cultural differences in finance 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.23***  0.30*** 1
15 Cultural differences in company values in general 0.48*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 1
16 Cultural  differences in values of key decision makers 0.49*** 0.23** 0.19** 0.22** 0.24*** 0.22** 1
17 Elimination of overlappings -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.1 0.07 1
18 Standardization of practices 0.01 0.1 0.02 0.18** 0.16+ 0.18** 0.20** 0.42*** 1
19 Decisions based on maximization of synergies 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.13+ 0.33*** 0.34*** 1
20 National cultural differences 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.16+ 0.08 0.09 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 1
21 Size of the acquired firm 0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16+ -0.08 0.02 -0.14* 0.05 -0.01 1
22 Time elapsed -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.15* -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.03 -.21** 1
23 Service industry 0.10 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 1
24 Respondent status (acquirer vs. acquired) -0.21** -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.13+ -0.19** -0.20** 0.13+ -0.05 -0.20** -0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.08
 













Table 2  Results of the measurement model  
Construct Measurement item Unstandardized Z-statistic Standardized Indicator Error
beta coefficient regression weight reliability variance
Organizational cultural differences Management and control 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.10
Sales and marketing 0.89*** 21.37 0.86 0.74 0.26
Production 0.80*** 16.78 0.79 0.62 0.38
Research and development 0.80*** 16.45 0.78 0.61 0.39
Finance 0.91*** 18.13 0.81 0.66 0.34
Company values in general 0.91*** 23.36 0.89 0.79 0.21
Values of key decision makers 0.89*** 24.02 0.89 0.79 0.21
Operational integration Elimination of overlappings 1.00 0.73 0.53 0.47
Standardization of practices 1.18*** 12.97 0.90 0.81 0.19
Decisions based on maximization of synergies 1.13*** 12.46 0.86 0.74 0.26
Social conflict Different opinions 1.00 0.91 0.83 0.17
Cooperation problems 1.02*** 22.32 0.93 0.86 0.14
Conflicts 0.83*** 16.46 0.81 0.66 0.34
Mistrust between the employees 0.79*** 14.06 0.74 0.55 0.45
Knowledge transfer Management and control 1.00 0.88 0.77 0.23
Sales and marketing 0.96*** 18.17 0.87 0.76 0.24
Production 0.89*** 14.68 0.78 0.61 0.39
Research and development 0.85*** 14.79 0.78 0.61 0.39
Finance 1.06*** 17.56 0.85 0.72 0.28
***p <0.001
 
Table 3 Construct validity and reliability 
Construct Composite  Average  
  reliability variance 
Organizational cultural differences 0.95 0.73 
Operational integration 0.87 0.69 
Social conflict 0.91 0.72 







Table 4 Results of the structural model  
  
Hypothesis Description of path Hypothesized Unstandardized Z-statistic
direction beta coefficient
H1a National cultural differences -> Social conflict + -0.27*** -3.33
H1b Organizational cultural differences -> Social conflict + 0.96*** 7.57
H2a National cultural differences -> Knowledge transfer + 0.16** 2.63
H2b Organizational cultural differences -> Knowledge transfer + 0.53*** 4.55
H3 Operational integration -> Social conflict + -0.07 -0.55
H4 Operational integration -> Knowledge transfer + 0.44*** 4.58
H5a National cultural differences -> Operational integration + 0.13+ 1.96
H5b Organizational cultural differences -> Operational integration + 0.75*** 9.05
H6 Social conflict -> Knowledge transfer - -0.27*** -4.22
Control National cultural differences -> Organizational cultural differences 0.71*** 13.46
Control Size of the acquired firm -> Knowledge transfer -0.04 -1.15
Control Time elapsed -> Knowledge transfer 0.07+ 1.93
Control Service industry -> Knowledge transfer 0.05 1.38
Control Respondent status (acquirer vs. acquired) -> Knowledge transfer -0.03 -0.91










Figure 2 Illustration of results5 
 
 
                                                 
5 This is a simplified version of the actual model. It does not show error terms, or the indicator variables of 
the latent constructs or the control variables. We added an error term to each of the endogenous variables to 
account for the variance that was not explained by the observed exogenous variables. To enable model 
identification, the error coefficients were fixed to unity. Parameters are standardized maximum likelihood 
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